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This paper investigates the automation reliability and the transparency in automation conflict
resolution advisories for air traffic control. Four general effects: those of traffic load, those of
expertise and, those of imperfect automation and its mitigation by automation transparency in the
context of the lumberjack analogy were examined. The results showed that the two automation
functions, the conflict resolution advisor (CRA) and the vertical situation display (VSD) offer
benefits for both novice and professional controllers’s performance and increased situation
awareness across traffic loads, even when the former is of imperfect reliability.
Automation Conflict Avoidance Aids
The next generation airspace procedures will be coupled with a wealth of new technology and automation
tools, in order to accommodate the anticipated 2-fold growth in traffic density (IATA, 2016). One such automation
tool of particular interest to our research is the air traffic control conflict resolution aid (CRA), and it is its
evaluation that we report here. In the following, we briefly examine conflict avoidance automation tools for ground
(ATC) operations. We then describe some of the general principles of human interaction with imperfect automation
before presenting a synopsis of three experiments that have evaluated the imperfect CRA.
Conflict avoidance operations can benefit from support for two different predictive automation tools:
conflict detection, and conflict resolution aids. On the ground, the air traffic controller’s conflict detection tasks are
well supported by the automation conflict alert (CA) system (Wickens, Rice, et al. 2009). However the operational
controller is not currently supported by the tool corresponding to the airborn Traffic Alert and Collision Avoidance
System (TCAS). That is, not supported by an automation-ground based conflict resolution advisor, although
prototypes have been evaluated (Prevot, et al. 2012; SESAR, 2016).
One feature of all such conflict avoidance automation tools, an inevitable consequence of their functionality
of predicting the future which is inherently uncertain (Herdener, et al. 2016) is that they are imperfectly reliable,
prone especially to generate false alarms (or nuisance alarms), and more so at longer look-ahead times (Dixon &
Wickens, 2007). However the TCAS false alarm rate appears generally to be low enough (reliability high enough) so
as to still offer considerable benefits; and the same has been found for the CA for controllers (Wickens et al., 2009).
In these cases the automation error rate is at a level below a threshold of around 25%, above which assistance is no
longer proffered (Wickens & Dixon, 2007).
However it remains uncertain the extent to which an imperfect CRA will offer assistance relative to
unaided conflict resolution, because such empirical research does not appear to have been conducted outside our
laboratory. Instead the general R&D evaluations have implemented automated resolution advisories that will always
increase separation, relative to the trajectory of the uncorrected aircraft (i.e.;, 100% relliablity). Yet because of the
extreme complexity and density of the future airspace, it is likely that some such “automation errors” could occur.
The pilot, receiving advice from the CRA-assisted controller may receive three categories of such errors: advice to
maneuver in a manner that clearly decreases the anticipated minimum separation, advice to maneuver in a different
direction or axis than one preferred by the pilot from the standpoint of energy management, fuel consumption or
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passenger comfort, and advice that avoids an immediate conflict, but now places the aircraft on a trajectory toward a
new one. Our implementation of the imperfect CRA employs the third of these categories.
The Lumberjack Analogy
We can place the imperfect conflict avoidance aids (both detection and resolution) within the context of the
automation stages & levels taxonomy initially applied to air traffic control automation by Parasuraman, Sheridan
and Wickens (2000), and subsequently supported by strong empirical evidence from a meta-analysis carried out be
Onnasch Wickens, et al., (2014), who coined the term “degree of automation” (DOA) defining automation that did
“more cognitive work” relative to the human operator who is supported by that automation. While the full taxonomy
is more complex than space allows here (See Sebok & Wickens, 2016), within the current conflict avoidance
framework, we specify two degrees of automation. At a lower degree is conflict detection, a diagnostic or situation
assessment aid that advises “what is”. At a higher degree is conflict resolution, a decision aid that advises “what to
do”. This increase in DOA from SA support to decision support was predicted (Parasuraman, Sheridan, & Wickens,
2000), found (Onnasch et al., 2014 ) and modeled (Sebok & Wickens, 2016) to (a) improve nominal performance
and reduce workload when automation functioned correctly, but (b) lead to greater problematic, and sometimes
catastrophic consequences on the infrequent occasions when automation failed (or failed to operate as expected by
the human supervisor). In terms of the lumberjack analogy: “the higher the tree, the harder it falls”.
One of the key features revealed by the meta-analysis carried out by Onnasch et al (2014) is that the greater
problematic response to automation failures, with the higher degree of imperfect automation, was paralleled by a
loss of situation awareness in those circumstances. This loss is triggered by being more “out of the loop” in decision
automation which enables automation to select or advise actions, compared to SA-support automation that still
forces the operator to actively choose actions. Such active choices better implant the state of the system in the
operators’s memory, i.e., an increaese of situationn, via a phenomenon known in memory theory as the “generation
effect” (Slamecka & Graf, 1989; Hopkin, 1995).
The final piece in our puzzle and basis of our current predictions, is that, if SA is lacking with decision
support automation, it can be restored by effective automation transparency, or displays that provide more graphic
information about the current state of the environment from which automation draws its action recommendations
(Bizantz & Seeong, 2008; Mercado et al., 2016). Thus our argument in the current project is that, to the extent that
controller-CRA interaction is hindered by the occurrence of occasional imperfections or automation errors (a
prediction we expect to confirm), this problematic response can be mitigated by a display supporting controller
situation awareness. What then should this display be? In the typical ATC console, the controller is well supported
in lateral awareness by the “radar display” or plan view display (PVD). But less so in vertical (altitude) awareness
because most information about altitude and relative altitude is depicted in symbolic digital data tags, a less than
ideal way of conveying trend information about the relative altitude of multiple aircraft. Hence our transparency
mitigation was designed to provide controllers with a vertical situation display (VSD), a concept receiving
substantial research in the flight deck CDTI (e.g., Battiste & Johnsons, 2002; Thomas & Wickens, 2008), but less so
in ATC (SESAR, 2013). In particular, to our knowledge, no research has been carried out joining the two
automation concepts of the VSD and the CRA, let alone in circumstances in which the CRA is imperfect. Our
program of research does this.
In the three experiments described below, we first show that the CRA can assist resolution performance,
and can even do so when it is imperfect, relative to fully manual performance. We do this with modest traffic load
(experiment 1; Trapsilawati et al., 2015) and then with much higher traffic load (experiment 2; Trapsilawati, et al.,
2016) evaluating the greater dependence on the CRA in the latter conditions. Because both of these experiments are
published, we only describe them briefly here. Then in experiment 3, we evaluate the possible mitigation
effectiveness of transparency provided for some participants by the VSD to support the human response to
automation failures, within the framework of the lumberjack analogy. Because we do not examine conflict detection
aids here, our tree is always high (decision aiding); we document its fall, but also show that we can lessen the impact
of the fall with the VSD.
Methods
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All three experiments involved the same general simulation and methods, described in some detail in
Trapsilawati et al., 2015, 2016, and only briefly here. Participants, either students within the Aeronautical and
Aerospace programs, or professional controllers viewed the TRACON display in an NLR ATC simulator
(NARSIM). They were responsible for moving traffic through the sector, and avoiding loss of separation (conflict
avoidance). During a typical 1 hour session, 5 conflicts would be imposed, at unpredictable times, leading to an
LOS if not control action was taken. This action was implemented by a voice input (e.g., “change heading to 030”)
and carried out by a pseudopilot, where the changed trajectory would be then visible on the display.
The four experimental sessions differed from each other in terms of the automation support offered by a
CRA. In this regard, the CRA was either absent (manual performance only) present and fully reliable, or present and
“imperfect” such that one of the advisories directed an aircraft to change trajectory and avoid an immediate conflict,
but in the process, created a predicted conflict with a second aircraft. The latter predicted conflict did NOT trigger
advice from the CRA. As such erroneous advice occurred in one trial out of 5 in the imperfect automation block, the
overall CRA reliability could be said to be 80%; although prior to the first time a failure was observed in the
imperfect session block, the controller would experience it as having 100% reliability, since no failures were
imposed during the training blocks. This first failure will be particularly relevant to our evaluation of support for the
lumberjack analogy. Participants were free to comply with or ignore the advice of the CRA if they felt that an
alternative maneuver was preferable. During each session, participants were periodically probed with a SPAM
situation awareness question regarding the current status of the airspace (Durso & Dattel, 2004). The latency to
respond to the ready probe assessed overall workload (OWL), and the accuracy measure of the probe response
assessed SA.
In all experiments, a generic TRACON space was employed. In Experiment 1, employing 12 controllers
who were primarily students, traffic density was 30 aircraft per hour In Experiment 2, employing 24 participants,
again primarily students, traffic density was increased to either 60 or 90 (between groups) to simulate the projected
growth of airspace congestion that would benefit more from automation assistance. In Experiment 3, employing
exclusively professional controllers, in which the VSD was imposed, traffic density was set at a constant level of 60
aircraft. In the following we refer to students as “novices” and to professional controllers as “experts”.
Results
Figure 1 shows, on the X axis all three experiments juxtaposed, with the three automation conditions along
the X axis defining the shape of each line. The relative scale of each of these three dependent variables
(performance, top; situation awareness, middle; OWL, bottom), is arbitrary as each has been transformed so that
they show minimum overlap within the figure. The important factors are the shape of the profiles of each 3-point
line, and the relative position of the three profiles across experiments. These relative positions are connected by
dashed lines. The following general observations can be made:
Differences, due to Traffic Load, between Experiments 1 and 2
Experiment 2, with its higher traffic load shows an overall reduction of performance compared to
Experiment 1 (p= 0.02). However, the reduction of SA (p= 0.12) and the increased workload (p= 0.63) were not
significant. Experiment 2, with greater traffic load shows OWL to be greater in the manual condition than with
automation. Stated in other terms, in Experiment 2, with its higher traffic load, in fact, there is a greater benefit of
CRA automation to reducing workload, whether the CRA was reliable or not, and the CRA automation in
Experiment 2 actually restores workload to a level equivalent to that of the lower traffic load in experiment 1, as
indicated by the significant interaction between the automation condition and experiment/traffic load (p= 0.04).
Differences in Profiles between Experiments 1&2 (Novices) and 3 (Experts)
To allow for direct comparison between novices and experts, we did the analysis between Experiment 2
with medium traffic condition (novice participants) vs Experiment 3 without the VSD condition (expert participants)
where the air traffic loads were similar. We found that overall performance was not significantly different between
novices and experts (p= 0.36). However, the interaction effect was significant (p= 0.03), showing much better
performance of experts than novices in the manual condition. Novices’ overall SA was marginally higher than that
of the experts (p= 0.08). However no difference of SA was found across automation conditions for either novices or
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experts (p= 0.20). The experts’ workload is considerably lower than novices although the trend was not significant
(p= 0.14).

Figure 1 Results of the Three Experiments. The three color coded lines of different width within each experiment
define each of the three critical independent variables; Performance (% resolved conflicts) at the top, Situation
awareness (% correct) in the middle, and Objective workload (OWL: ready response latency) on the bottom.
The Examination of Lumberjack Analogy based on Data of Experiment 3
The presence of the VSD slightly improved conflict resolution performance (from 89% to 94%, F (1, 18) =
1.35, p= 0.26), substantially increased situation awareness (from 59% to 73%; F (1, 16) = 4.13, p= 0.059) and
significantly lowered workload (from 7.78s to 5.38s; F (1, 14) = 8.57, p= 0.01). The VSD was found to have
equivalent effects across all three automation conditions (i.e., no interaction between automation condition and
display).
On the first failure trial, for the block in which the CRA was unreliable; performance accuracy was
compared with all correct trials, in which automation was functioning correctly. Here the accuracy for the four
combinations of automation accuracy and VSD support is shown in Table 1. Examining these data, we observed
what could be interpreted as a significant interaction effect, in that a test of proportions revealed a substantial
significant decrement of the 25% reduction without the VSD (Z= 2.36, p= 0.02), but no significant effect (Z= 1.08,
p= 0.28) of the 7.5% decrement when the controller was supported by the VSD.
Table 1.
The First Failure Analysis.
Display Conditions
VSD
No VSD

Automation Correct Trials
97.50%
95.00%

Automation Failure Trial
90.00%
70.00%

Discussion
Overall the results allowed us to examine three general effects: those of traffic load, those of expertise and,
most critically, those of imperfect automation in the context of the lumberjack analogy.
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Workload/Traffic Load
In comparing experiment 1 (low density=30) with Experiment 2 (high density= 60 or 90), both using
primarily novice controllers, we found that increasing density produced a decrease in performance, a trend of loss in
situation awareness and only a very slight increase in objective workload. We might argue that, when these novice
controllers confronted the high traffic density, their performance went over the “red line” of workload (Grier, 2008),
which could not be rated higher (they were “maxed out”; and hence could give no more resources), even as the gap
between resources demanded and those supplied increased, hence lowering performance. At maximum capacity in
Experiment 2, the novices also diminished any resources available for maintaining SA. Hence there was a trend of
SA degradation.
Controller Expertise
In comparing the overall results of Experiment 2 with those of Experiment 3, both at medium-high
workload/traffic load levels, the most obvious difference is the increase in performance of the experts (Experiment
3), particularly when controlling manually (without CRA automation assistance). This is not surprising. Experts
generally are better performers. This increase was attained with no change in workload, but with a marginal loss in
SA, an effect that is somewhat surprising.
The Lumberjack Analogy
To examine the lumberjack analogy, we focus attention at greater depth only on the performance of the
experts in Experiment 3, as this performance is most generalizable to the real world of air traffic control and only
hee can we examine the mitigating effoects of the VSD. Here we find, as with the first two experiments, a benefit of
automation, although this benefit was reduced, given the higher baseline level of manual performance of the experts
in Experiment 3. Somewhat unexpectedly, we also found an increase in situation awareness with automation,
contrary to the standard “folk lore” of automation (Sebok & Wickens, 2016) in which automation is assumed to
produce an out-of-the-loop unfamiliarity syndrome, breeding complacency, dependency and “the automation bias”
(Mosier & Skitka, 1996), and mediated by a loss, not a gain of situation awareness. In accounting for this departure
from our expectations, we assume that, unlike some other cases, our expert professional controllers invested any
resources saved by the CRA decision aid, into deeper processing the raw data from the display.
Insofar as the lumberjack analogy itself is concerned, we have partial support for its expression. On the one
hand, experts did not perform significantly worse overall with imperfect (80% reliable), than with perfect
automation blocks, even though there was a non-significant trend in that direction. On the other hand, on the single
(and first) failure trial, they did perform worse, with a detection rate, when unsupported by the VSD that dropped
from 95% (on the correct trials) to 70%. We also found that this problematic failure cost was mitigated by the
automation transparency provided by the VSD relative to the control group. The former showed only a small (7.5%)
non-significant loss of performance on the failure trial, while the latter showed a large loss of 25%. Finally, we ask
if this failure recovery difference between the two groups was mediated by a difference in situation awareness. Here
the interpretation is again ambiguous. On the one hand the VSD did substantially improve SA. But on the other
hand, such an improvement was equally manifest on both manual trials and on those supported by perfect
automaton. Hence we cannot infer that the differential performance improvement was associated with a differential
increase in SA.
The ambivalence of theoretical interpretation notwithstanding, we can conclude with certainty that the two
aspects of technology examined here, the automation of the CRA, and the SA support of the VSD are both of
benefits to professional controllers, even when the former is of imperfect reliability.
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